[Main article with sub-articles]

Teaser

Why do people keep using—even when costs mount? What distinguishes alcohol’s legal market from heroin’s illegal market? And how do incentives, norms, and strategic interaction shape both use and policy outcomes? In this essay I braid together (1) Robert H. Frank’s microeconomics-and-behavior lens, (2) pure rational choice in the spirit of Norman Braun and James S. Coleman, (3) principal–agent theory for drug supply chains, and (4) game theory for enforcement, markets, and the “self vs. future self.” I end with interdisciplinary brain teasers for seminar use.

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1) Microeconomics (with Robert H. Frank’s behavioral edge)

Baseline. Choices reflect preferences under constraints (prices, income, time, risk). In standard demand, higher price → lower quantity; with addictive capital (past use raises current utility and tolerance), today’s consumption is linked to tomorrow (Becker & Murphy, 1988). (IDEAS/RePEc)

Frank’s twist. Real humans show bounded rationality and social preferences:

• Reference-dependence & loss aversion make quitting feel like a loss vs. a new baseline.
• Present bias (hyperbolic discounting) overweights “now” relative to “later.”
• Commitment & identity (e.g., “no weekday drinking”) act as self-binding devices.
• Positional goods & norms give alcohol or drug use status/identity utility beyond pharmacology. (See Frank’s book and textbook for the broader synthesis.) (wwnorton.com)

Implication. Elasticities and “welfare” are socially embedded—pricing and availability work through norms, identities, and commitment opportunities, not only through budgets.

More theory

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2) Pure rational choice (Braun; Coleman)

Local rationality under constraints. Following Norman Braun, people optimize given their information and opportunity set, even when outcomes harm them (Braun, 2002). Coleman’s boat links macro conditions (prices, policing, stigma) → micro incentives → actions → macro outcomes (prevalence, harm). (De Gruyter Brill)

• Raise the cost of immediate relief (price, time, stigma) or lower substitute costs (therapy access, sober spaces, transport), and choices shift.
• “Irrational” binges often maximize short-run relief when chronic stress or weak protection distorts the opportunity set.

More theory

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3) Principal–Agent (PA) theory in drug markets

3.1 Legal alcohol (regulated supply chain)

Principals/agents: Regulators ↔ producers/retailers; firms ↔ staff; customers ↔ bartenders.
Hidden actions: Overservice; weak ID checks; promotions that spur harm.
Instruments: Excise/minimum unit pricing, overservice liability, random compliance checks, server training, ad constraints.
Because the market is licit, contracts, audits, and fines are enforceable.

3.2 Illegal heroin (prohibited supply chain)

Principals/agents: Importers/wholesalers ↔ street sellers; sellers ↔ customers.
Hidden actions: Adulteration, skimming, misreporting, risky locations.
Without courts, governance shifts to reputation, surveillance, and violence, creating quality uncertainty (lemons). Medication-assisted treatment, drug checking, and supervised consumption partially legalize the interface, reducing PA failures. (Core PA references and classic lemons logic.) (De Gruyter Brill)

More theory

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4) Game theory: markets, policing, and the self

4.1 Enforcement vs. dealers (inspection games). Police choose inspection intensity, sellers choose exposure; mixed strategies and displacement can result.
4.2 Seller–seller interaction (Hawk–Dove/coordination). Violence vs. tacit peace; legal alcohol relies on competition law, illegal heroin on informal governance—harm rises in “Hawk” equilibria.
4.3 Seller–buyer trust (signaling & reputation). Repeated play sustains quality; one-shot play breeds lemons. (OUP Academic)
4.4 Intrapersonal game (present vs. future self). Present-biased agents seek commitments (self-exclusion, deposits, delays). (American Economic Association)
4.5 Harm reduction as coordination. Needle exchange or safe spaces are stag hunts; public provision shifts payoffs to the safe equilibrium.
(For rational addiction’s dynamic complementarity and present bias foundations.) (IDEAS/RePEc)

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5) Triangulation: the integrative picture

• Microeconomics quantifies how constraints change behavior; behavioral explains why people still choose relief (loss aversion, present bias, identity). (mheducation.com)
• Rational choice (Braun; Coleman) pinpoints where to move incentives and how micro → macro links generate aggregate harms. (De Gruyter Brill)
• Principal–agent clarifies supply-side pathologies: alcohol can be contracted and audited; prohibition pushes governance to reputation/violence with quality risk. (De Gruyter Brill)
• Game theory anticipates strategic adaptation (enforcement/displacement) and the intrapersonal conflict—where commitment and harm-reduction improve equilibria. (American Economic Association)

Illustrative policy menu

• Alcohol (legal): Minimum unit pricing; outlet-density rules; overservice liability; robust ID checks; alcohol-free third places; commitment options (self-exclusion, deposit contracts).
• Heroin (illegal): Agonist therapy and safe supply pilots to collapse quality uncertainty; drug checking; supervised consumption; decriminalized possession to weaken violence-based governance.
• Cross-cutting: Make commitments easy (self-bans, time locks); fund third places; use randomized rather than predictable checks; price high-risk formats relatively higher.

More theory

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Method note (Grounded Theory)

I treat this as a public memo: I’ll code interviews, policy documents, and price/availability datasets against the four lenses, then refine categories (commitment, adverse selection, coordination failure) via constant comparison.

AI co-author disclosure

I collaborate with an AI co-author for outlining, synthesis, and polishing; I remain responsible for selection, verification, and argument. Any generative vignettes will be tagged [HYPOTHESIS].

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Sociology Brain Teasers (interdisciplinary; 6 items)

1. Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) and Identity. Show how MUP can reduce heavy episodic drinking with (a) standard demand, (b) loss aversion, (c) status signaling. Which non-price measure preserves identity utility?
2. Heroin Purity and Lemons. Use Akerlof to explain why average purity falls during crackdowns. Propose one reputation/testing mechanism that raises predictable purity without full legalization. (OUP Academic)
3. The Bar Manager’s PA Problem. Owner wants ID compliance; bartenders earn tips from speed. Design a contract + monitoring bundle that aligns incentives without harming service quality.
4. Self vs. Future Self (Repeated Game). Model “no weekday drinking” as repeated play between present and future selves. Name two commitment devices that stabilize cooperation. (American Economic Association)
5. Harm Reduction as Stag Hunt. Draw the payoff matrix for needle exchange; specify one policy nudge that moves the population to (Cooperate, Cooperate).
6. Coleman Boat for a City Ban. A city bans sidewalk alcohol at night. Trace macro rule → micro incentives → actions → macro outcomes (displacement, equity). Where can PA fixes preserve inclusion? (hup.harvard.edu)

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Literature & Links (APA)

• Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488–500. Oxford Academic (publisher) · JSTOR. (OUP Academic)
• Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2004). Willpower and personal rules. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4), 848–886. UChicago Press (index) · Author PDF. (IDEAS/RePEc)
• Becker, G. S., & Murphy, K. M. (1988). A theory of rational addiction. Journal of Political Economy, 96(4), 675–700. UChicago Press (index) · JSTOR. (EconPapers)
• Braun, N. (2002). Rationalität und Drogenproblematik. De Gruyter Oldenbourg. Publisher page. (De Gruyter Brill)
• Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Harvard University Press. Publisher page. (hup.harvard.edu)
• Frank, R. H. (1988). Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. W. W. Norton. Publisher page. (wwnorton.com)
• Frank, R. H. (2008). Microeconomics and Behavior (7th ed.). McGraw-Hill. Publisher page. (mheducation.com)
• Holmström, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74–91. JSTOR page. (JSTOR)
• Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291. JSTOR page · Author/offprint PDF. (JSTOR)
• Laibson, D. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 443–478. Oxford Academic (publisher). (OUP Academic)
• Laffont, J.-J., & Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal–Agent Model. Princeton University Press. Publisher extract (PUP). (PagePlace)
• MacCoun, R. J., & Reuter, P. (2001). Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times, and Places. Cambridge University Press. Publisher page. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)
• O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999). Doing it now or later. American Economic Review, 89(1), 103–124. AEA publisher page. (American Economic Association)
• Reuter, P. (1983). Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand. MIT Press. Publisher page. (MIT Press)

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Publishable version of the prompt

“Please write a WordPress-ready article that triangulates microeconomics (Robert H. Frank’s behavioral angle), pure rational choice (Norman Braun; James S. Coleman), principal–agent theory (with a comparison of legal alcohol vs. illegal heroin markets), and game theory (markets, enforcement, and intrapersonal commitment). End with interdisciplinary brain teasers for students. Include APA references with publisher-first links and add a short Grounded Theory method note and AI co-author disclosure.”

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Prüfprotokoll

• Status: WordPress-ready v2.0 (links + prompt added).
• Checks: All references linked to publisher/author pages (or JSTOR where appropriate).
• Next steps: Want a matching 4:3 header image in our blue/teal/orange style depicting “prices, contracts, and strategies” (tags: demand curve, handshake/contract, game tree)?