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Local rationality under constraints. I start with Norman Braun’s insistence that people optimize given their information and opportunity set—even when the longer-run outcome harms them. If cheap relief is available now, while therapy slots, transport, or safe spaces are scarce or slow, then a “binge” can be locally rational: it maximizes utility on the feasible frontier. The point isn’t to praise the choice; it’s to diagnose the constraints that make it reasonable. (For Braun’s full treatment of drugs and markets in a rational-choice frame, see the De Gruyter edition.) (De Gruyter Brill)

Coleman’s boat: from macro rules to micro moves (and back). James S. Coleman formalized how macro conditions—prices, policing, stigma—reshape micro incentives, which produce actions that aggregate into macro outcomes (prevalence, harm). In practice I trace four arrows:

1. Macro → Situations. Minimum unit pricing, ID checks, patrol density, or waiting-list length set the menu of options—including hidden prices like shame or delay. (hup.harvard.edu)
2. Situations → Incentives. The person calculates expected relief vs. expected costs (money, time, legal risk, social loss).
3. Incentives → Actions. Drink now? Delay? Seek treatment? Switch to an alcohol-free venue?
4. Actions → Macro. Many such choices shift harm curves, hospital load, and neighborhood dynamics—feeding back into the next policy round. (Overviews of the “boat” and its micro-macro logic are widely available.) (tuhat.helsinki.fi)

Operationalizing the “opportunity set.” In real lives, the set includes: money prices, time prices (clinic hours, travel), risk prices (enforcement; losing a job if absent), and social prices (stigma, status loss). Change any of these and the argmax can flip without touching “willpower.” That is why raising the cost of immediate relief (e.g., price floors on ultra-cheap ethanol) or lowering substitute costs (walk-in therapy, alcohol-free “third places,” late-evening transport) predictably shifts choices. (IDEAS/RePEc)

Why “irrational” binges can be rational on the day. Under chronic stress or weak protection, the shadow price of waiting skyrockets: the world offers little credit for tomorrow’s health but instant relief for tonight’s pain. Given such weights—and given learning from past use—the short-run binge maximizes subject to constraints. The remedy, in a Braun–Coleman synthesis, is not moral exhortation but rebuilding the feasible set so that the best response is also the least harmful one. (De Gruyter Brill)

Two quick worked examples (using the boat).

• Alcohol (legal). Macro: a state introduces minimum unit pricing and funds alcohol-free venues. Micro: cheap high-ABV formats disappear; social alternatives gain status; late-night buses reduce time cost of leaving early. Action: some heavy episodic drinkers downgrade or delay consumption; some switch venues. Macro outcome: fewer intoxication admissions; demand shifts toward lower-risk formats. (IDEAS/RePEc)
• Heroin (illegal). Macro: city scales up opioid agonist therapy with same-day induction and decriminalizes possession for personal use. Micro: the cost/risk of the substitute (OAT) falls, the stigma price of help-seeking drops. Action: more enrollments, fewer rushed street purchases. Macro outcome: lower overdose mortality; black-market volatility loses customers. (This complements but is distinct from behavioral models; it’s a pure incentives story.)

Take-away. The Braun–Coleman lens tells me where to push: move prices, times, risks, and stigma in ways that make safer actions the best responses. It also tells me how to evaluate interventions: watch the micro incentives they actually change, not only their intentions. (De Gruyter Brill)

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Literature & Links (APA)

• Braun, N. (2002). Rationalität und Drogenproblematik. De Gruyter Oldenbourg. Publisher page. (De Gruyter Brill)
• Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Harvard University Press. Publisher page. (hup.harvard.edu)
• Becker, G. S., & Murphy, K. M. (1988). A theory of rational addiction. Journal of Political Economy, 96(4), 675–700. IDEAS/UChicago Press index · JSTOR. (IDEAS/RePEc)
• On “Coleman’s boat” expositions:
  Raub, W., & Voss, T. (2016). Micro-Macro Models in Sociology: Antecedents of Coleman’s Diagram. In Micro-Macro Linkages (pp. 11–32). De Gruyter. Chapter page;
  Hänninen, V. (2021). Understanding the Coleman Boat. University of Helsinki. PDF. (De Gruyter Brill)

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Publishable version of the prompt

“Please expand the section ‘2) Pure rational choice (Braun; Coleman)’ into a coherent essay using Norman Braun’s local-rationality lens and James S. Coleman’s macro → micro → macro ‘boat’. Show how changing prices, time costs, risks, and stigma reshapes the opportunity set and turns different actions into best responses. Include two worked examples (alcohol; heroin) and provide APA references with publisher-first links.”

Prüfprotokoll

• Status: Enriched section v1.0 (WordPress-ready).
• Checks: Links verified (publisher-first or authoritative sources); Braun and Coleman accurately represented.

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