What each lens adds—and why none is sufficient alone.

• Microeconomics tells me how constraints move behavior: raise money/time/risk prices of high-harm options or lower the cost of substitutes, and demand shifts. Behavioral economics explains why relief still “wins” in the moment: loss aversion makes cutting down feel like a loss; present bias overweights now; identity and status utilities (what a drink means) travel with the price tag (Frank, 2008).
• Rational choice (Braun; Coleman) pinpoints where to push: change the opportunity set (prices, waiting times, legal risk, stigma) and you change best responses—then track the micro → macro aggregation back to prevalence and harm.
• Principal–Agent (PA) reveals supply-side pathologies: in licit alcohol markets, we can contract, audit, and fine; under prohibition (heroin), governance devolves to reputation/force, injecting quality uncertainty straight into risk.
• Game theory anticipates strategic adaptation (e.g., enforcement → displacement) and surfaces the intrapersonal game (present vs. future self), where commitments and harm-reduction tools move the system to better equilibria.

How the pieces interlock in practice

1. Prices work better with identities. Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) deletes ultra-cheap ethanol (microeconomics), but uptake accelerates when we reframe reference points (“dry weekdays”) and supply status-preserving substitutes (behavioral/Frank).
2. Opportunity sets, not pep talks. If the time price of help is high (waitlists, travel) and the money price of relief is low, a binge maximizes today’s payoff (Braun). Shrink the first, raise the second, and “best response” pivots without morality plays (Coleman’s boat).
3. Fix the interface to fix risk. For heroin, PA says the worst harms come from information asymmetry (purity, potency). Agonist therapy, drug checking, supervised consumption install legal monitors—institutional reputation and observability—to collapse lemons-style risk at the user interface.
4. Design for equilibrium, not one-off wins. Inspection games teach that deterministic crackdowns invite adaptation; randomized, modest checks reduce displacement while preserving resources. In the intrapersonal game, cheap commitments (self-exclusion, deposits, brief delays) help present-biased selves cooperate with their future selves.

Equity and evaluation (so we know it’s working)

• Equity: Regress harms on exposure to prices, distance/waiting time, and stigma proxies. If burdens cluster among precarious groups, retune the bundle (e.g., pair MUP with transport vouchers and late-hour counseling).
• Metrics: (a) product mix (high-ABV/cheap share ↓), (b) ED admissions/overdose mortality, (c) treatment initiation and retention, (d) purity variance where checking exists, (e) uptake of commitment tools, (f) displacement indicators (place/time).
• Learning loop: Treat policy as adaptive—iterate like a controlled experiment rather than a one-shot fix.

---

Illustrative policy menu (with mechanism notes)

Alcohol (legal)

• Minimum Unit Pricing → removes ultra-cheap, high-ABV formats (microeconomics).
• Outlet-density rules → fewer high-cue environments per square km (game theory: lower exposure).
• Overservice liability + robust ID checks → align firm/staff incentives (PA multitask fix).
• Alcohol-free third places → identity-compatible substitutes (behavioral/Frank).
• Commitment options (self-exclusion, deposit contracts, short “cool-off” timers for delivery) → intrapersonal cooperation (game theory/AEA).

Heroin (illegal)

• Agonist therapy (OAT) & safe-supply pilots → collapse quality uncertainty; stabilize demand away from lemons dynamics (PA).
• Drug checking → third-party verification; public risk signals (PA + coordination).
• Supervised consumption → observability at the riskiest moment; link to care (PA).
• Decriminalized possession → weaken violence-based governance; redirect interfaces to health (game-theoretic displacement control + PA).

Cross-cutting

• Make commitments easy (self-bans, time locks, deposits) and dignified (behavioral + intrapersonal game).
• Fund third places (libraries, sports, alcohol-free nights) that carry status as well as safety (behavioral/Frank).
• Randomize inspections where enforcement remains—avoid fully predictable patterns (inspection games).
• Price high-risk formats higher (microeconomics), while lowering time/money cost of help (rational choice).

---

Literature & Links (APA)

• Braun, N. (2002). Rationalität und Drogenproblematik. De Gruyter Oldenbourg. Publisher page
• Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Harvard University Press. Publisher page
• Frank, R. H. (2008). Microeconomics and Behavior (7th ed.). McGraw-Hill. Publisher page
• Laffont, J.-J., & Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal–Agent Model. Princeton University Press. Publisher extract
• O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999). Doing it now or later. American Economic Review, 89(1), 103–124. AEA page
• Becker, G. S., & Murphy, K. M. (1988). A theory of rational addiction. Journal of Political Economy, 96(4), 675–700. IDEAS/UChicago

---

Publishable version of the prompt

“Please enrich the section ‘5) Triangulation: the integrative picture’. Synthesize what microeconomics + behavioral (Frank), rational choice (Braun; Coleman), principal–agent, and game theory each contribute—and how they interlock for alcohol (legal) and heroin (illegal). Add equity/evaluation notes and a mechanism-annotated policy menu. Include APA references with publisher-first links.”

Prüfprotokoll

• Status: Enriched section v1.0 (WordPress-ready).
• Checks: Mechanism claims align with cited sources (Frank/McGraw-Hill; Braun/De Gruyter; Coleman/HUP; Laffont & Martimort/PUP; AEA for O’Donoghue & Rabin; IDEAS for Becker & Murphy).