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Baseline. In textbook terms, I start with choices under constraints: prices, income, time, and risk. Demand slopes downward; raise price and—other things equal—quantity falls. With addictive capital, though, today’s use raises tomorrow’s propensity to use by changing both tolerance and the cue-response machinery—a dynamic Becker and Murphy formalized to show why current consumption is linked intertemporally to future consumption (Becker & Murphy, 1988; see UChicago Press/JSTOR). When I look at alcohol or opioids through that lens, price and availability still matter, but they move on a track already laid by yesterday’s choices.

Frank’s twist: real humans in real contexts. What I find most useful in Robert H. Frank’s synthesis is how clean microeconomics is widened by behavioral and social insights without losing analytical discipline:

• Reference dependence & loss aversion. Once “two glasses after work” has become the reference point, cutting down feels like a loss, not a neutral reversion. Because losses loom larger than gains, people over-weight the short-run pain of quitting relative to the diffuse long-run benefits. That helps explain why many prefer “not today” even when they endorse change in the abstract (Frank, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
• Present bias (time inconsistency). Hyperbolic discounters sincerely plan to stop tomorrow, but when “tomorrow” becomes “now,” the steep near-term discount rate pulls the choice back toward use. Economically, this is a self-control problem that generates demand for commitment devices (Laibson, 1997; Frank, 1988).
• Commitment & identity as capital. Rules like “no weekday drinking” act as self-binding contracts. They create an identity return—“this is who I am”—that competes with the pharmacological return of the substance. I treat these identities as a form of personal capital that yields dividends in self-respect, reputation, and predictability to others (Frank, 1988).
• Positional goods & norms. The utility of a Bordeaux or a craft IPA is not only ethanol; it is status, belonging, talkability. In some fields, moderation signals cultural capital; in others, bravado signals in-group loyalty. Frank’s positional perspective helps me price those social utilities alongside the chemical ones (Frank, 2008).

What this means for elasticities (and policy). If utility includes relief, ritual, and recognition, then price elasticities are socially embedded:

• Heavy vs. moderate users. Heavier users tend to be less price-responsive in the short run (tolerance, withdrawal), but they still react to targeted price floors that remove the very-cheap, very-strong options (minimum unit pricing).
• Substitution & complementarity. Cross-price effects matter: raise the relative price of high-ABV cheap formats and some consumers substitute toward no/low-alcohol or toward non-alcoholic social activities—if such substitutes exist and carry positive identity returns.
• Norms as multipliers. A tax change delivered with autonomy-supportive messaging (“choose a mindful option”) and visible alcohol-free alternatives shifts behavior more than a tax alone, because it tweaks reference points and status signals, not just budgets.
• Welfare with internalities. If present bias (“I’ll quit tomorrow”) and loss aversion (quitting feels like a loss) create internal harms, then standard consumer-surplus welfare underestimates the value of commitment scaffolds (cooling-off, time locks, self-exclusion) and identity-compatible substitutes (alcohol-free “third places”). I read Frank here as a guide to soft paternalism that respects agency while repairing predictable decision errors.

A concrete bundle I would test. Pair minimum unit pricing (to remove ultra-cheap high-risk ethanol) with:

1. Choice architecture that defaults evening events to attractive no/low-alcohol options;
2. Identity framing (“Dry Weekdays” badges, peer recognition) so reduction is a status-preserving move;
3. Self-commitments (deposit contracts, self-exclusion from late-night venues, or literal egg-timer limits for digital alcohol ordering) to counter present bias. In Frank’s spirit, that bundle tilts the playing field toward long-run selves without humiliating the short-run one.

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Literature & Links (APA)

• Becker, G. S., & Murphy, K. M. (1988). A theory of rational addiction. Journal of Political Economy, 96(4), 675–700. UChicago Press / IDEAS · JSTOR
• Frank, R. H. (1988). Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. W. W. Norton. Publisher page
• Frank, R. H. (2008). Microeconomics and Behavior (7th ed.). McGraw-Hill. Publisher page
• Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291. JSTOR · Author offprint
• Laibson, D. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 443–478. Oxford Academic

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Publishable version of the prompt

“Please enrich the section ‘1) Microeconomics (with Robert H. Frank’s behavioral edge)’ into a coherent essay that explains baseline rational choice, Becker–Murphy’s addictive capital, and Frank’s behavioral/social additions (loss aversion, present bias, commitment, positional goods). Draw practical policy implications (pricing, substitutes, identity framing) and provide APA references with publisher-first links.”

Prüfprotokoll

• Status: Enriched section v1.0 (WordPress-ready).
• Checks: All claims aligned with cited works; links are publisher-first or authoritative indexes.

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